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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Torts-Injury to Trespassing Child-Attractive
Nuisance Doctrine
Plaintiff, a six-year-old boy, while playing on a pile of timberp
placed on defendant's railroad platform was injured when one of the
timbers fell. Defendant had knowledge of the fact that children resorted
to the platform and pile to play. Held: nonsuit affirmed. The evidence
does not disclose that the pile of timbers was inherently dangerous, or
so attractive or alluring as to impose upon the defendant the duty to
anticipate and guard against the efforts of children to play there.1
Until a comparatively recent date,2 the common law refused to rec-
ognize liability of a landowner to trespassers injured by dangerous con-
ditions on the land. But it is now established in many states that a
trespassing child of tender years may recover for injuries sustained as
a result of dangerous conditions of the land.3
Some courts have based this newly recognized duty to keep one's
premises safe for anticipated child-trespassers on the fiction that a
child is attracted or allured by the dangerous object or condition and
thereby enters by implied invitation as an invitee, to whom the land-
owner owes a duty of ordinary care.4 Others have sustained the doc-
trine on the maxim that one must so use his property as not to harm
others ;5 others, that a child of tender years is not a trespdsser, or at
best, only a technical trespasser;6 still others, that an attraction of
1 Boyette v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 227 N. C. 406 42 S. E. 2d 462 (1947).
- Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29, 113 Eng. Reprint 1041 (1841), is advanced as
original authority for the attractive nuisance doctrine. There a child was injured
when he climbed upon defendant's horse cart left standing untied in the highway.
Sioux City S. Pac. R. R. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (U. S. 1874) is the leading
"turntable" case. See 38 Am. JuR., NEGLIGExCE §143.
'For a list of states see: Note, 36 A. L. R. 34 (1925) ; Hudson, The Turntable
Cases in the Federal Courts, 36 HARv L. Rxv. 826, 854, n. 103 (1922-1923) ; 22
WASH. U. L. Q. 141, n. 2 (1936) ; 45 C. J. 785, n. 9.
For coverage of the general doctrine see: Jeremiah Smith, Liability of Land-
owters to Children Entering Without Permission, 11 HARv. L. Rxv. 349, 434
(1897-98); Hudson, The Turntable Cases in the Federal Courts, 36 HARv. L. REv.
826 (1922-23) ; Green, Landozwr v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of
Responsibility in Tort, 21 MicH. L. Rav. 495 (1922-23). Townes, Is a Restate-
mentof the Law as to the Liability Arising from Dangerous Premises Desirable
and Practical, 1 TEx. L. REv. 1, 388 (1922-23). For emphasis on the North
Carolina situation see: Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine,
1 N. C. L. Rav. 162 (1922); Note, 13 N. C. L. REv. 340 (1934).
' Wilmes v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., 175 Iowa 101, 116, 156 N. W. 877, 883
(1916) ("He [defendant] is charged with liability because of the imputed knowl-
edge of the habits of children to use a thing so temptingly presented as a play-
thing, and he is liable because he has invited the child. ."), Keffe v. Milwaukee
and S. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am. St. Rep. 393 (1875); United Zinc & Chemical
Co. v. Van Britt. 258 U. S. 268 (1922).
'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas "teaches nothing but a benevolent yearn-
ing." Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARv. L. Rrv. 1, 3 (1894-95). See
Chesko v. Delaware & H. Co., 218 Fed. 804 (C. C. A. 3rd 1914) ; Alabama G. S. R.
Co. v. Crocker, 131 Ala. 584, 31 So. 561 (1901).' Hardy v. Missouri P. R. Co., 266 Fed. 860 (C. C. A. 8th 1920).
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children by a dangerous instrumentality amounts to an intention to
injure, 7 or a reckless disregard of safety," or a trap.0
Cases emphasizing-attraction and allurement, as opposed to danger
.and foreseeability, especially in those jurisdictions that adopt the fiction
of implied invitation, have tended to limit the principle of recovery
"to the point of absurdity." 10 Not infrequently recovery has been lim-
ited to the case "where the child was shown to have trespassed only
because of the attraction." The result has been doctrinaire rules of
liability, undesirable and unwieldly in the field of negligence.'
2
The most satisfactory theory adopted seems to be that the land-
owner's liability rests upon "the general legal standard of social con-
duct," i.e., due care under the circumstances."3 As so recognized the
rule reads as follows: "An owner or occupier of land must use such
care as a man of ordinary prudence would use under the circumstances
to prevent serious hurt to others because of the dangerous condition of
his premises when such condition is known, or should have been known,
to him and may be remedied or guarded against readily with reasonable
cost, when the presence of other persons and their exposure to such
hurt may reasonably be anticipated."
14
Some twenty-seven cases involving the "attractive nuisance" doc-
trine have arisen in North Carolina.' 5 The general attitude of the court
'Jeremiah Smith, supra note 3 at 355, criticizes as grossly erroneous the find-
ing of an intent to injure.
.Altus v. Millikin, 98 Okla. 1, 223 Pac. 851 (1924); Shawnee v. Cheek, 41
Okla. 227, 137 Pac. 724 (1913).
9 Keffe v. Milwaukee and S. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am. St. Rep. 393 (1875).
1 "Wilson, supra note 3 at 166. One need only refer to the annotation in 36
A. L. R. 34 (1925) to verify this conclusion.
"United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Van -Britt, 258 U. S. 268 (1922) is the lead-
ing case.
12 , . . it is not fashionable to speak of the landowner's duty to use care in
maintaining his land, and many courts have attempted instead to make a set of
fixed rules built on categories to do the work of a standard.... The result is
that inclusions in the categories are varied to suit the cases. .. H" udson, supra
note 3 at 847.
" Hudson, supra note 3 at 840-845, argues for the theory in this vein: The
social interest in the general security and the social interest in the development of
land and freedom of enterprise are to be balanced. These competing forces are
best reconciled by a standard of judgment, its application dependent upon the
variables of each case, ie.,.the general legal standard of social conduct-that one
act with due care. under the circumstances to avoid injury to others. See Gim-
mestad v. Rose Bros. Co., 194 Minn. 531, 534, 261 N. W. 194, 195 (1935) where
it is said: "Here the duty of defendants must necessarily !find its source in special
circumstances in which, by reason of the inducement and of the fact that visits
of children to the place would naturally be anticipated, and because of the char-
acter of the danger to which they would unwittingly be exposed, reasonable pru-
dence would require that precautions be taken for their protection.' Best Adm'r
v. District of Columbia, 291 U. S. 411, 419 (1933)."
"'See Townes, supra note 3. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS, §339 (1934).
'I Nichols v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 228 N. C. 222, 44 S. E. 2d 879, 1947;
Boyette v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 227 N. C. 406, 42 S. E. 2d 462 (1947) ; Barlowe
v. Gurney, 224 N. C. 223, 29 S. E. 2d 681 (1944); Hedgepath v. Durham, 223
N. C. 822, 28 S. E. 2d 503 (1943) ; Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 220 N. C.
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may be said to favor a guarded application of the doctrine.16 Recovery
has been allowed the trespassing child in but three situations: where
the instrumentality was (a) a charged electric wirelT or (b) dynamite
caps,18 or (c) an artificial pool of water.'0 The following observations
can be made: (1) Conditions where recovery was allowed have all been
artificial and obviously of extreme danger.20 (2) Plaintiff must gen-
782, 18 S. E. 2d 412 (1941); Harris v. Winston-Salem Ry., 220 N. C. 689, 18
S. E. 2d 204 (1941) ; Prather'v. Bank, 211 N. C. 98, 189 S. E. 182 (1936) ; Cum-
mings v. Dunning, 210 N. C. 156, 185 S. E. 653 (1936) ; Jackson v. Standard Oil
Co., 208 N. C. 766, 182 S. E. 490 (1935); Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 398,
177 S. E. 114 (1934); Boyd v. Atlanta & C. R. R., 207 N. C. 390, 177 S. E. 1
(1934) ; Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925) ;
Graham v. Sandhill Power Co., 189 N. C. 381, 127 S. E. 429 (1925) ; Richardson
v. Libes, 188 N. C. 112, 123 S. E. 306 (1924) ; Lineberry v. North Carolina Ry.,
187 N. C. 786, 123 S. E. 1 (1924) ; Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178 N. C. 383, 100
S. E. 619 (1919) ; Krachanake v. Acme Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 435, 95 S. E. 851
(1918) ; Gurley v. Power Co.,- 172 N. C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916) ; Ragan v.
Traction Co., 170 N. C. 92, 86 S. E. 1001 (1915) ; Parker v. Charlotte Electric
Ry., 169 N. C. 68, 85 S. E. 33 (1915) ; Starling v. Selma Cotton Mills, 168 N. C.
229, 84 S. E. 388 (1915) ; Barnett v. Cliffside Mills, 167 N. C. 576, 83 S. E. 826
(1914) ; Benton v. Public Service Co., 165 N. C. 354, 81 S. E. 448 (1914) ; Greer
v. Damascus Lumber Co., 161 N. C. 116, 76 S. E. 731 (1912) ; Ferrell v. Dixie
Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911) ; Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting
and Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E. 600 (1908); Kramer v. Southern Ry.,
127 N. C. 328, 37 S. E. 468 (1900).
Ten of these cases are not strictly under the attractive nuisance doctrine either
because the child was on public property, or the ownership of the property was
in a third party or not shown on the record, or the child was an invitee or licensee.
But the cases are pertinent and important for their discussions and references to the
doctrine. See supra this note: the Cummings case, the Campbell case, the Graham
case, the Corner case, the Gurley case, the Ragan case, the Parker case, the Benton
case, the Greer case, and the Kramer case.
"e Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925),
"We are not disposed to extend the so-called attractive nuisance doctrine."
'Graham v. Sandhill Power Co., 189 N. C. 381, 127 S. E. 429 (1925)
(whether defendant owned the land not on the record) ; Ferrell v. Dixie Cotton
Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911) (plaintiff's intestate trespassed and
swung on charged wire).
8 Richardson v. Libes, 188 N. C. 112, 123 S. E. 306 (1924) ; Krachanake v.
Acme Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 435, 95 S. E. 851 (1918) (Brown, J., dissented saying
that there was no evidence that plaintiff knew caps were on the premises) ; Barnett
v. Cliffside Mills, 167 N. C. 576, 83 S. E. 826 (1914). Bu cf. Luttrell v. Caro-
lina Mineral Co., 220 N. C. 782, 18 S. E. 2d 412 (1941) (held, as matter of law,
evidence insufficient to charge defendant with knowledge that children played on
the premises).
" Barlowe v. Gurney, 224 N. C. 223, 29 S. E. 2d 681 (1944); Brannon v.
Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 398, 177 S. E. 114 (1934); Starling v. Selma Cotton Mills,
168 N. C. 229, 84 S. E. 388 (1915). Recovery denied in these cases: Hedgepath
v. Durham, 223 N. C. 822, 28 S. E. 2d. 503 (1943) (defendant had no notice
children swam in pool, nor was pool so attractive as to charge him with notice.) ;
Gurley v. Power Co., 172 N. C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916) (defendant company
had no notice that its servant was allowing children to swim in its tank; servant
bey6nd scope of his employment).
In Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925),
recovery was allowed where four-year-old started and fell from negligently parked
electric truck, but the court emphasized the fact that the truck was parked on a
public street and that the intestate child was a member of the public.
0 Boyette v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 227 N. C. 406, 408, 42 S. E. 2d 462, 463
(1947) (". . . doctrine of the turntable cases should be applied to all things that
are uncommon and are artificially produced . . . and are attractive and are in-
herently dangerous.... Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222."). Cf. Hudson,
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erally be not over twelve years of age to escape the defense of con-
tributory negligence.2 1 This is a jury question.22 (3) Failure of the
parents to prevent the injury is generally not a bar to recovery.2
(4) Whether defendant owes a duty to plaintiff depends on (a) main-
tenance of an "attractive nuisance" or dangerous instrumentality or
condition, 24 and (b) reasonable foreseeability that children are likely to
come upon the land and be hurt by contact with the object.25 The court
would seem to say that both "a" and "b" are questions of law.20 It is
intimated that extreme attractiveness alone will charge defendant with
notice.27 (5) Even if "a" and "b" of "4," supra, are established, it
supra note 3 at 852, where it is said: "It seems quite impossible to draw a satis-
factory line between 'artificial and natural' uses, or normal and abnormal." No
North Carolina cases on the natural condition of land seem to have arisen. Query:
Would the court deny recovery where a small, useless quicksand bog, natural but
easily protected was frequented by children to the knowledge of the defendant?
21 Graham v. Sandhill Power Co., 189 N. C. 381, 127 S. E. 429 (1925) (a boy
of fourteen is presumed to be able to sense and avoid danger, but proof of lack
of intelligence is admissible; attention commensurate with child's mental age is
required); Briscoe v. Henderson Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E. 600 (1908)
(court could find no cases where boy of thirteen could rely on "attractive allure-
ments of machinery"); Barnett v. Cliffside Mills, 167 N. C. 576, 83 S. E. 826
(1914) (recovery allowed where trespassing child of eleven exploded dynamite
caps)."2Graham v. Sandhill Power Co., 189 N. C. 381, 127 S. E. 429 (1925).2"Ferrell v. Dixie Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911); Comer
v. Winston-Salem, 178 N. C. 383, 100 S. E. 619 (1919).
"2 Sce note 20 supra.
2' Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting and Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E. 600
(1908) is the leading North Carolina case on this point. At page 411 it is said:
"... liability for injuries to children sustained by dangerous conditions on one's
premises is recognized . . . provided the facts are such as to impose the duty of
anticipation or prevision; that is, whether under all the circumstances he should
have anticipated that children would be attracted or allured to go upon his prem-
ises and sustain injury." A dictum to the effect that the owner may be charged
with notice by the very nature of the object is found in Barlowe v. Gurney, 224
N. C. 223, 29 S. E. 2d 681 (1944). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §339 comment a;
38 Am. Jim.. NEGLIGENCE §145.
Reasonable foreseeability that children may enter and be injured is established
only by showing that children often played on the premises and that defendant
knew or could reasonably have known of their habit to play on or near the
instrumentality. Barlowe v. Gurney, 224 N. C. 223, 29 S. E. 2d 681 (1944) (re-
covery allowed where children commonly played around and in pool, as defendant
knew); Hedgepath v. Durham, 223 N. C. 822, 28 S. E. 2d 503 (1943) (nonsuit
aff'd, no evidence that children ever swam in the pool); Luttrell v. Carolina
Mineral Co., 220 N. C. 782, 18 S. E. 2d 412 (1941) (evidence must show that
children habitually played on the premises and that defendant knew this or should
have known it).
"6 Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 220 N. C. 782, 789, 18 S. E. 2d 412, 416
(1941) (". . . what is negligence is a question of law [in North Carolina] and
when the facts are admitted or established the court must say whether it does or
does not exist. 'This rule extends to the question of negligent breach of duty
and also to the feature of proximate cause.' Hoke, J., in Hicks v. Mfg. Co., 138
N. C. 319, 50 S. E. 703 [1905]."). It is clear that most North Carolina cases
on the trespassing child situation are dismissed because the court finds no duty
owed under the circumstances. Boyette v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 227 N. C. 406,
42 S. E. 2d 462 (1947); Hedgepath v. Durham, 223 N. C. 822, 28 S. E. 2d 503
(1943).
'See note 25 supra.
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would appear that the court must find that the utility of maintaining
the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children involved
therein.28  (6) Defendant's breach of duty by failure to exercise the
care reasonably demanded under the circumstances must be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury.29 This, too, is a question of law if only one
inference can be drawn from the facts.3 0 (7) The duty to the plaintiff
established, failure of the defendant to exercise due care under the cir-
cumstances is a question of fact for the jury.3 1
North Carolina, though apparently adopting the general negligence
rule,32 frequently complicates the theory upon which recovery is based
by (a) citation of-cases from jurisdictions using the theory of allure-
ment as invitation,3 3 (b) by distinguishing cases which are brought
before it "bottomed" on negligence from those "bottomed" on the
principle of "attractive nuisance as elucidated in Sioux City S. P. R. R.
v. Stout," and apparently applying different rules of recovery,34 and
(c) by categorizing certain objects as attractive nuisances as opposed
to those which are not.35 The court often speaks of attraction and
allurement as if they were a sine qua non of liability.36 It is submitted
"Note, 13 N. C. L. REv. 340 (1934). REsTATEMENT, ToRTs §339(d) (1934).
29 Prather v. Bank, 211 N. C. 98, 189 S. E. 182 (1936).
'0 Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 220 N. C. 782, 18 S. E. 2d 412 (1941).
2 1Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., supra note 30. Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207
N. C. 398, 177 S. E. 114 (1934)."2 Note, 13 N. C. L. REv. 340 (1934).
"Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 398, 177 S. E. 114 (1934) ; Ferrell v. Dixie
Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911).
-, Boyette v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 227 N: C. 406, 407, 42 S. E. 2d 462, 463
(1947) ("Plaintiff's action is not bottomed on the principle of attractive nuisance
. .. but on negligence... !" The court then points out that the plaintiff cannot
recover on negligence, nor can he recover on the attractive nuisance doctrine). In
Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925), the
court evidently could not find that an electric truck was an "attractive nuisance'
but managed to grant recovery without trouble since plaintiff's complaint was
based on negligence. See note 16 supra.
" Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 398, 177 S. E. 114 (1934) (Connor, J.,
dissenting on grounds evidence does not show that well was an attractive nuisance) ;
Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925) (electric
truck is not an attractive nuisance, but recovery allowed on negligence prin-
ciples) ; Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178 N. C. 383, 100 S. E. 619 (1919) (bridge
not an attractive nuisance but recovery allowed on negligence principles) ; Gurley
v. Power Co., 172 N. C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916) (dictum that attractive nuisance
doctrine not applicable to pools or reservoirs).
"Thus in Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting and Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62
S. E. 600 (1908) the court sustained a demurrer to the complaint saying that
plaintiff failed to allege that children had been allured or attracted to the premises,
or that plaintiff had in fact been attracted thereon. Again in Ferrell v. Dixie
Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911) the court cites with equal
facility and approval cases which follow the implied invitation doctrine (often
requiring that the plaintiff be lured) and cases -which require due care under
the circumstances. The dissent in Krachanake v. Acme Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 435,
95 S. E. 851 (1918) would deny recovery on the basis that children were not
attracted by the instrumentality.
The tendency of the court to circumscribe the principle of recovery with legal
definitions of what is or is not an attractive nuisance may possibly be attributed
to a desire to keep the issue out of jury hands.
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that the attractiveness of the object is an element only to the extent that
it helps answer this question: "Did the landowner know or by reason-
able care could he have known that children were likely to trespass on
a part of the land upon which he maintained a condition likely to be
dangerous to them because of their childish propensities to intermeddle
or otherwise ?,,37
The principal case, while in harmony with the reasoning of past
decisions and while the result seems equitable, continues what is sub-
mitted as an undesirable precedent by classifying certain instrumental-
ities as attractive or dangerous instead of clearly recognizing that
liability should rest primarily upon foreseeability of injury to a child
whose presence should have been anticipated. "The greater the hazard,
the greater the care required."88 The court should repudiate all ref-
erence to the fiction of implied invitation and "attractive nuisance" and
affirm the principle that recovery be based entirely on general principles
of negligence.
LENNOX P. MCLENDON, JR.
Trusts-Inheritance by Murderer-The Constructive Trust
and a Statutory Solution*
In a recent case,1 the Georgia Supreme Court decided that a hus-
band inherited his wife's estate under the statute of descent and dis-
tribution in spite of the fact that he had murdered her, holding that
it was not justified in reading into a clear and unconditional statute an
exception denying the right of a murderer to inherit from his victim.
Statutes of descent and distribution and the Statute of Wills gen-
erally contain no such exception, and in the absence of other specific
"
7 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §339, comment a (1934). Gimmestad v. Rose Bros.
Co., 194 Minn. 531, 261 N. W. 194 (1935).
' Gimmestad v. Rose Bros. Co., 194 Minn. 531, 536, 261 N. W. 194, 196
(1935). At page 536, 261 N. W. 194, 196, the court continues: "Nothing more
is needed to support the proposition that one who maintains on his premises an
artificial condition is liable for resulting injury to young children trespassing
thereon if:
'(a) The place where the condition is maintained is one upon -which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and
'(b) The condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and
which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily injury to such children, and
'(c) The children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area made
dangerous by it, and
'(d) The utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as
compared to the risk to young children involved therein.' RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(Tentative Draft No. 4) §209 [RESTATEMENT, TORTS §339 (1934)]."
* The closely related problems arising in the fields of insurance, bank deposits,
and other property relationships are outside the scope of this note.
1 Crumley v. Hall, 43 S. E. 2d 646 (Ga. 1947).
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